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Abstract 
A growing body of recent work in informal logic investigates the process of 
argumentation. Among other things, this work focuses on the ways in which individuals 
attempt to understand written or verbalised arguments in light of the fact that these are 
often presented in forms that are incomplete and unmarked. One of its aims is to develop 
general procedures for natural language argument recognition and reconstruction. Our aim 
here is to draw on this growing body of knowledge in informal logic in order to take 
preliminary steps towards developing an architecture for computer systems that are able to 
recognise and reconstruct natural language arguments. This architecture aims to structure 
research of an applied and computational nature that strives to implement linguistic 
systems of various sorts, and to analyse problems in a way that both yields manageable 
and relatively independent components and also highlights how implementations can 
interact with existing resources from natural language processing. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a substantial and growing body of work in informal logic that investigates the 
processes of argumentation, including that of reasoning structure recognition and 
reconstruction. Such work considers the ways in which individuals attempt to understand 
written or verbalised arguments in light of the fact that these are often presented in forms 
that are incomplete (e.g. forms that do not contain an explicitly stated conclusion) and 
unmarked (e.g. forms that do not contain terms which, like ‘therefore’ or ‘accordingly’, are 
typically used to stand for inferences). Some of this work in informal logic is designed 
primarily to assist in the teaching of informal logic (see, for example, (Govier, 1997)). 
However, some of it aims primarily to develop general procedures for natural language 
argument recognition and reconstruction (see, for example, (Hitchcock, 1985; Gilbert, 
1991)). Clearly, the identification of such procedures is of importance to research into 
natural language understanding in AI. Specifically, it is of importance to research into the 
creation of computer systems that engage in natural language argumentation or reasoning, 
and to research into the development of computer systems that could play a part in 
automating the labour-intensive process of creating text corpora of natural language 
arguments. Thus, taking our cue from research in informal logic, we here take preliminary 
steps towards developing an architecture for computer systems that are able to recognise 
and reconstruct natural language arguments.  
Of course, a great deal of work in computational linguistics and AI has examined the 
tasks of natural language generation and natural language understanding in general, and 
some has examined argumentation as a subspecies of language (Cohen, 1987; Elhadad, 
1995; Reed, 1999). However, we approach the problem from a different direction, viz., 
that of informal logic, and thereby exploit theoretical and empirical results that are specific 
to argumentation and the theory of argument (van Eemeren et al., 1996).  
Our goal is to develop an architecture that can structure research of a more applied and 
computational nature that strives to implement linguistic systems of various sorts. This 
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architecture is to analyse the problems in a way that yields manageable and relatively 
independent components, and that also highlights how implementations can interact with 
existing resources from natural language processing. 
We begin by presenting an argument taken from the magazine Outlook India and 
following one plausible path of reconstructing it. In light of our reconstruction, we outline, 
in general form, a commonsense view of the steps that readers go through in recognising 
and reconstructing arguments. We then outline a theory of the nature of natural language 
arguments and show how these components can be synthesised into an architecture of a 
computational model that implements recognition and reconstruction of arguments. 
Finally, we summarise successfully implemented subsystems that substantiate the 
applicability of the general architecture. 
 
2. Argument Reconstruction: A Case Study 
In the present section, we examine a short text and reconstruct it in a plausible way. Doing 
so will allow us to identify a number of general conclusions about how arguments are 
reconstructed from texts. Consider, then, the following excerpt from an article that 
appeared in Outlook India (and that is part of an online corpus of argumentation (Katzav et 
al., 2004)): 
 
It's the old Orissa drought and starvation story being played out again. This time in 
Rajasthan. Even as the casualties mount, the state and central governments would like the 
world to believe that the deaths were caused by disease and lack of hygiene rather than by 
abject poverty and starvation. But for anyone who visits Rajasthan's Baran district, the 
apathy of the district administration and the failure of the Public Distribution System (pds) 
is clear to see. Whatever spin you give it, it is hunger that is claiming its victims [Outlook 
India, “Grass is For Cows”, by Bhavdeep Kang, 04 November 2002]. 
 
Excerpt 1 
 
 
The first thing a reader intent on reconstructing arguments needs to do in examining such 
an excerpt is to determine whether it does indeed contain an argument. On some 
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occasions, terms that typically represent inferences allow this to be done. Terms such as 
‘thus’, ‘therefore’ and ‘accordingly’ can alert the reader to the likely presence of an 
inference, and hence to the likely presence of an argument. If such syntactical cues are 
present, they are likely to be used. However, in Excerpt 1, as is often the case, there are no 
terms that typically represent inferences. Nevertheless, the content of the excerpt allows a 
reader to conclude that it does contain an argument. In reading it we come to understand 
that the author, Kang, is contrasting the government’s claims about the causes of the 
deaths in Baran with his own views, and, further, we come to see that he is not merely 
asserting his own views but arguing for them.  
We are first alerted to the fact that Kang intends to contrast two possible 
explanations for the casualties in Baran when he uses the phrase ‘the ... governments 
would like [us] to believe.’ This subjunctive phrasing is characteristically used to express 
scepticism about what it is that it is desired that we believe, and thus leads us to expect an 
alternative to what it is we are supposed to believe. More importantly, after we are told 
what it is that the government wants us to believe, the term ‘rather than’ is used to state the 
contrast between the view that the deaths were caused by disease and lack of hygiene, and 
the view that they were caused by abject poverty and starvation.i Once we are aware that 
the author has noted this contrast, we expect criticism of the government’s claim. This 
expectation is strengthened by the fact that the sentence that follows the stated contrast 
begins with the term ‘but’. Kang writes, “But for anyone who visits Rajasthan's Baran 
district, the apathy of the district administration and the failure of the Public Distribution 
System (pds) is clear to see”. The term ‘but’ suggests that what follows will be yet another 
statement that conflicts with the government’s position. Moreover, the reader realises that 
it does so by describing something the presence of which would (supposedly) make it 
liable that hunger will claim its victims. Accordingly, the reader realises that the statement 
that the term ‘but’ introduces is supposed to be a reason to expect death as a result of 
poverty and starvation, and thus that it is supposed to be a reason to think that the 
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government is wrong about the root causes of the deaths in Baran. Here, then, it becomes 
clear that Kang is offering an argument. 
 As we have seen, syntactic cues given by inferential terms need not appear in 
arguments, and thus cannot be relied upon in argument detection. Similarly, as formal 
arguments that only rely on syntactic and semantic cues illustrate, pragmatic cues such as 
‘they want us to believe’ cannot be relied on in argument detection. Moreover, while 
recognising pragmatic cues yields evidence for the presence of arguments, doing so does 
not involve recognising arguments themselves. In the excerpt we have been considering, 
recognising the argument itself consists in recognising that the apathy of the district 
administration and the failure of the Public Distribution System (supposedly) makes liable 
death due to poverty and starvation, and thus that the statement that describes the apathy of 
the district administration and the failure of the Public Distribution System (supposedly) is 
a reason to expect death thus caused.ii 
 After having determined that an argument is present in a text, we need to determine 
what exactly the argument is. Some of what is needed to do this has already been 
accomplished. We can conjecture that the argument’s conclusion is, (a) ‘it is hunger that is 
claiming its victims’, and that one of its premises is, (b) ‘the district administration is 
apathetic and the Public Distribution system has failed’. This conjecture can be made on 
the grounds that the fact described by (b) supposedly makes liable the fact described by 
(a). 
 Notice that Kang is explicit that his claims are about Baran at a particular time. 
Thus we assume, in a manner that is not dependent on the process of argument recognition 
and reconstruction, that (a) and (b) represent certain facts at this place and time, even 
though the information they convey does not suffice to pick out these facts. Thus, we 
assume that (a) and (b) are elliptical representations of what Kang in fact intends to say 
using (a) and (b). Specifically, we assume that (a) is elliptical for, ‘it is hunger that is 
claiming its victims in Baran towards the end of 2002’ and (b) is elliptical for, ‘towards the 
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end of 2002 in Baran, the district administration is apathetic and the Public Distribution 
system has failed.’ 
We can also, at this point, conjecture that the argument contains at least one 
missing premise. In determining that an argument is present, we have recognised that 
(supposedly) if the fact described by (b) is the case, then the fact described by (a) is liable 
to be the case. We have, to put things more directly, recognised that (supposedly) if the 
district administration is apathetic and the Public Distribution system has failed, then it is 
liable to be the case that hunger claims its victims. However, the argument contains no 
explicit claim to this effect. 
 What remains, then, is to determine what the argument’s missing premise is. This 
too is achievable. Once we have grasped that the fact described by (a) is represented as 
conveying or bringing about the fact described by (b), we can conjecture via which 
relation of conveyance this is supposed to occur. Given our background knowledge, 
including our grasp of the nature of the facts described in (a) and (b), we can see that the 
relation in question involves some kind of causal dependence. Supposedly, the fact 
described by (a) is, in the circumstances, causally dependent upon the fact described by 
(b). Thus, we can assume that the connective ‘then’ in the missing premise ‘if the fact 
described by (b) is the case, then so is the fact described by (a)’ asserts some kind of 
causal dependence between what (a) describes and what (b) describes.iii 
Of course, since there are a variety of ways in which the fact described by (a) 
might be causally dependent on the fact described by (b), it is possible to raise other more 
general or abstract conjectures about the relations between these facts, and thus additional 
corresponding conjectures about the premise that is implicit in Kang’s argument. It might, 
for example, be supposed that some kind of general causal principle, or causal law, 
connects facts that are similar to the one described by (b) with facts that are similar to the 
one described by (a). Perhaps, for example, it is the case that, in a certain type of district, a 
combination of apathy on the part of its administration with the failure of its public 
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distribution system is liable to cause hunger to claim its victims. If so, the missing premise 
would supposedly be something like ‘in the appropriate circumstances, if facts of the same 
type as the one described by (b) are the case, then facts of the same type as the one 
described by (a) are liable to be the case’. There is, however, nothing in the text that would 
allow us to evaluate more general suggestions as to what the missing premise in Kang’s 
argument is. Moreover, all such suggestions entail that the fact described by (a) is causally 
dependent on the fact described by (b). Thus, the mere conjecture of causal dependence 
between the particular facts described by (a) and (b) is preferable in that it is not likely to 
go wrong even if there is some chance that Kang is committed to more than it attributes to 
him. In this way, we are following a parsimonious, even minimalist, programme in the 
reconstruction of enthymemes. 
A plausible reconstruction of Kang’s argument is, therefore, as given in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
The analysis diagrammed in Figure 1 is constructed according to conventional, textbook 
argument theory techniques – see, e.g., (Groarke et al., 1997). These techniques have been 
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embodied in a software tool custom built for such analysis (Reed and Rowe, 2004).  In the 
diagram, the explicit premise and conclusion of Kang’s argument are represented within 
white rectangles, and the reconstructed premise of his argument is represented in a grey 
rectangle. The premises do not support the conclusion separately. Thus, the lines drawn 
from the premises to the conclusion are linked to create one arrow indicating joint support. 
The conclusion is linked by a two-way arrow to a representation of the government’s 
position; thus indicating that they are in conflict. In addition, Kang’s premises and 
conclusion are all highlighted and described as a certain type of argument, namely a 
Causal Dependence Argument. We thus intend to convey the information that the fact 
described in Kang’s explicit premise and the fact described in his conclusion are causally 
dependent and that this dependence is asserted in the reconstructed premise. 
 
3. Argument Reconstruction: Presuppositions and Stages 
Having concluded our reconstruction of Kang's argument, we now proceed to describe, in 
a general manner, the stages that underlie this reconstruction and to clarify which aspects 
of this reconstruction we aim to model. 
 The process of reconstructing Kang's argument had five stages: 
1. Reconstruction of explicitly represented statements 
2. Argument recognition 
3. Enthymeme recognition 
4. Possible argument type recognition 
5. Missing premise/conclusion reconstruction 
Our focus here is on those stages of text recognition and reconstruction that involve 
argument recognition and reconstruction, that is to say those stages that are captured in 2-
5. In order to model these stages, we assume that stage 1 is carried out either manually or 
by building on automated and semi-automated text reconstruction techniques. To be more 
explicit, we assume the successful conversion of input text into text with the standard form 
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that is used by the system that is analysing it. A standardised text is one in which elliptical 
sentences have been replaced by complete equivalents, indexical terms have been replaced 
with appropriate descriptions, ambiguities have been disambiguated or noted, questions 
and imperatives that are in effect assertions have been replaced by assertions and all 
assertions are represented in some canonical or standard form that marks out their 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties. We also assume that a standardised text 
explicitly marks up all those propositions that are immediately detectable by a competent 
reader. In reading Kang’s argument, a competent reader will be immediately aware that the 
statement, ‘for anyone who visits Rajasthan's Baran district, the apathy of the district 
administration and the failure of the Public Distribution System (pds) is clear to see’ 
consists in a number of statements, including the statement that the district administration 
is apathetic and the statement that the public distribution system has failed. Thus, we 
assume that these constituent statements are explicitly marked up as components of 
Kang’s statement about what can be seen when visiting Baran. Finally, the standardised 
text marks up statements in accord with the types of fact they represent.iv Since this mark 
up in accordance with fact type carries the information that we suppose enables argument 
recognition and reconstruction, we will discuss its role in detail as we proceed to outline 
our views.  
 The standardisation of a text does not include making implicit statements that are 
components of its arguments explicit. In other words, statements that are components of 
the text's arguments but that are not already represented in the text by some syntactical 
device remain unrepresented by syntax after standardisation. So too, standardisation does 
not include identifying arguments as being of this or that type or even as being arguments.  
 From a computational point of view, the tasks involved in the standardisation of 
texts collectively represent an enormous challenge, and we do not seek to trivialise their 
role. There is little agreement even upon the format that such a representation should take. 
Recent textbooks such as (Pereira & Grosz, 1994) and (Blackburn & Bos, 1995) review 
 10
some of the current approaches with a heavy focus on representational aspects; broadly 
non-representational statistical approaches are also proving to be powerful in 
understanding sentence and inter-sentence meaning (Manning and Schutz, 1999), and 
large scale structures are then supported through techniques such as Rhetorical Structure 
Theory (RST) (Mann and Thompson, 1988), and Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) 
and its derivatives (Kamp and Reyle, 1993). Even at the most abstract levels of 
representation, however, it has been argued (Reed, 1999) that techniques such as RST and 
DRT do not adequately account for – or have the machinery to express – the structure of 
either surface form or deep meaning of arguments (in the sense of van Eemeren et al., 
1996). Here, we want to bracket the issue of computational natural language understanding 
to the point of propositional sense-making, and explore the extra problems and 
opportunities presented by argumentative structure.  
Of course, it has long been argued that neither natural language understanding nor 
its counterpart, natural language generation, should be seen as strictly pipeline processes 
from larger-scale to smaller-scale structures (de Smedt et al, 1996). There are certainly 
interesting interplays between large scale argument structure and lexical choice, to take 
just one example (Reed, 1999). This paper, however, focuses on those larger scale features 
that are particularly characteristic of argument, and that might not be accounted for 
elsewhere. The approach is to use tailor-made theories of argument structure developed in 
argumentation theory, informal logic and critical thinking as the starting point for 
developing a computational architecture that might account for them, and might make it 
easier for advances in argumentation theory to be interpreted in artificial intelligence 
(Reed and Norman, 2003). 
 We begin our examination on the assumption that the process of argument 
recognition and reconstruction occurs from 2 through to 5 in ascending order. That this 
assumption can be made to work is suggested by our description of the process of 
recognising and reconstructing Kang's argument. In our analysis of Excerpt 1, we assumed 
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an understanding of the statements in the text and, in light of this, identified the argument 
it contains. Only then did we proceed to determine what type of argument the argument is 
and to reconstruct the argument's implicit premise.  
 Nevertheless, merely proceeding through stages 2-5 in ascending order will not 
always do. Sometimes knowledge of the presence of an argument in a text cannot be 
acquired prior to missing premise reconstruction. For making an implicit premise explicit 
might reveal a hitherto unnoticed argument, one in which, say, the previously implicit 
premise is a conclusion rather than a premise. In order to address this possibility, our 
model will include a feedback mechanism. Having gone through stages 1-5 in an attempt 
to analyse the arguments within a given text, we require that a new modified text be 
produced by the computer system, one that is the result of explicitly appending to the 
original marked up text those argument components that have already been discovered to 
be implicit in it.v The modified text must itself, we will suggest, be re-submitted to the 
process of argument recognition and reconstruction in order to determine whether any of 
the modifications it contains themselves trigger yet further modifications. The analysis 
which our system is designed to achieve is attained only when it produces a text that can 
be re-submitted without alteration.vi 
  
4. Immediate Argument Detection 
Assume, then, that we have a standardised version of a given text. It is on this text that the 
computer system is supposed to carry out the process of argument recognition and 
reconstruction. For a computer system to do this, it must implement an appropriate theory 
of what an argument is.  It must also possess a relevant system of structured information 
and theory, as well as the ability to reason from its information and theory. In this section, 
we suggest one appropriate theory of what an argument is and illustrate how it can be used 
to enable a computer system immediately to recognise arguments within a text, that is to 
say to recognise arguments in a text without engaging in reasoning. We also say something 
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about the body of information and theory that must be implemented by a computer system 
if it is to be able to recognise arguments. In sections 5-6, we discuss how the computer 
system is to proceed with the stages of argument reconstruction that follow immediate 
argument recognition. In section 7, we describe how the computer system is to proceed 
when argument recognition does require reasoning. 
Reconstructing Kang’s argument suggested that the ability to recognise the 
presence of an argument in his text consists in being able to recognise that the apathy of 
the district administration and the failure of the Public Distribution system (supposedly) 
makes liable death due to poverty and starvation, and thus that the statement that describes 
the apathy of the district administration and the failure of the Public Distribution system 
(supposedly) is a reason to expect death thus caused. Generalising, being able to recognise 
an argument consists in being able to recognise that one fact (supposedly) makes liable or 
necessitates another fact. Thus, it is natural to view an argument as, roughly, a proposition 
that represents one fact as making another fact liable. vii 
Let us explain and make more precise the view of arguments being proposed here. 
Propositions are the contents of intentional attitudes. They are, for example, the contents 
towards which we adopt the intentional attitudes of belief and conjecture. We believe, for 
example, the proposition that the earth is not flat.viii Now, on our view, an argument is a 
proposition of a certain type. This is plausible since any argument can be referred to with 
an appropriate ‘that’ clause, and this is precisely how propositions are referred to. For any 
argument, R, we can refer to it as the argument that R, and this is precisely how we would 
refer to R if it were a proposition.ix 
When, then, is a proposition an argument? On our view a proposition is an 
argument if and only if it consists (just) in a representation of a fact as conveying some 
other fact. We will say that a proposition represents one fact as conveying another if and 
only if it represents one fact as, in the circumstances, necessitating or making liable the 
obtaining of the other.x As to facts themselves, they are simply identified with what true 
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propositions represent.xi 
The idea that one fact conveys another has been explicated in terms of the notions 
of necessitating and making liable. In order to get to grips with these notions note that if, 
in circumstances C, fact A necessitates fact B, then it is implied that, in circumstances C, 
A’s obtaining (i.e. A's being the case) is not possible without B’s obtaining. So too, it is 
implied that facts of the same type as A will, in similar circumstances, necessitate, and so 
invariably be accompanied by, facts of the same type as B. As to the notion of making 
liable, note that, if, in circumstances C, fact A makes fact B liable, then, in circumstances 
C, A’s obtaining makes B’s obtaining likely. 
When one fact conveys another it does so via the obtaining of some relation of 
conveyance between itself and the fact it conveys. A relation of conveyance is thus any 
relation in virtue of which, in the appropriate circumstances, one fact necessitates or makes 
liable another. Relations of conveyance include, among others, x’s causing y, x’s being a 
member of class y, x’s being a species of the genus y and x’s constituting y. On our view, 
then, each of these relations can be used in constructing arguments. 
Consider, by way of illustration, a case involving the causal relation. In the 
circumstances, the fact that the US military attacked Iraq caused the fall of Saddam’s 
regime. Thus, in the circumstances, and via or in virtue of the obtaining of a causal 
relation, the fact that the US military attacked Iraq necessitated, or at least made it liable 
that, Saddam’s regime fell. Using the causal relation and the above statements about 
Saddam’s regime, we can construct the following simple argument: 
 
(1) Saddam’s regime fell, because the US military attacked Iraq and if the US 
military attacked Iraq, Saddam's regime fell. 
 
In (1), the fact that the US military attacked Iraq is represented as conveying, via the 
causal relation, the fact that Saddam’s regime fell. That the relation of conveyance 
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represented is the causal relation is implicit in the conditional ‘if the US military attacked 
Iraq, Saddam’s regime fell.’ 
Given this conception of arguments, a propositional theory containing the 
appropriate background information, and the ability to compute closure over implication, it 
is possible automatically to determine whether any pair of propositions in the text being 
considered is such that either (a) one of the propositions in the pair represents a fact which 
supposedly necessitates or makes liable the fact that is represented by the other, or (b) one 
of the propositions represents a relation of conveyance which, together with the fact that is 
represented by the other proposition, supposedly necessitates or makes liable something.xii 
Where this is determined, it is possible to conclude that an argument is present in the text. 
To be sure, eliciting and representing the appropriate information in a knowledge base that 
might support an implementation of such a system is a huge task. However, it is one that 
(a) is largely independent of the mechanisms described here and (b) is amenable to 
approximation by more or less domain-dependent and brittle solutions such as, in the 
extreme, manual coding (Curtis et al. 2005). 
 Detecting the presence of an argument within a text by using the above strategy 
proceeds in one of two ways: it either does or does not involve reasoning. If, for example, 
a computer system’s structured information and theory explicitly contains a pair of 
propositions and also explicitly contains the information that one of these propositions 
represents a fact which necessitates or makes liable another in the circumstances, then, 
upon detecting these propositions in a text, the system can presume immediately (i.e. 
without reasoning) that it has detected an argument. This, then, suffices to tell us how 
immediate argument detection is to proceed. If a computer system’s structured information 
and theory does not explicitly represent a text as containing an argument, the computer 
system will have to determine whether given its embedded information and theory, and 
given additional information gleaned from the text, it can deduce that the text contains 
representations of facts as conveying others, thus allowing the (reasoned) conclusion that 
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arguments are present in the text. As already stated, we will discuss how reasoned 
argument detection is to proceed in section 7. 
 Before turning to discuss the question of how a computer system is to proceed after 
immediate argument recognition, we need to say a few more words about the structured 
information and theory that it must implement if it is to detect the presence of arguments 
in texts. Since our aim is that the system should be able to reconstruct a text in a way that 
best captures the intentions of the writer who produced the text, the system ought to 
embody information and theory that the writer in question is thought to possess. Of course, 
this does not mean that the system ought to possess every piece of information that the 
writer possesses. Rather, it is merely to say that it ought to possess the same general 
background information and commonsense theory needed by individuals if they are to 
understand texts of the kind under consideration – this is the same requirement imposed 
throughout general natural language processing, and is not specific to argument. 
 In addition, just as sentences within the text being analyzed must be marked up 
according to the types of fact they represent, the system's background information and 
theory must be implemented by marking up sentences in accordance with which types of 
fact they represent. Such mark up is essential to reducing the complexity of the tasks 
involved in argument recognition and reconstruction. For instance, it enables a computer 
system to avoid going through each explicit argument in its background information and 
theory in order to determine whether one of these is an argument that represents fact A, 
which is represented by a sentence gleaned from a text, as making liable fact B, which is 
also represented by a sentence from the text. Given that the types of A and B are known to 
the system, it need only examine a subset of the explicit arguments it possesses, i.e. those 
which represent a fact of the same type as A as conveying a fact of the same type as B.  
 Similarly, the mark up of propositions in accordance with the types of facts they 
represent helps a computer system avoid having to examine each pair of propositions in a 
text in order to determine whether the text contains an argument from the one to the other. 
 16
One attributes to a text the assumption that a fact represented by a proposition p  
necessitates or makes liable a fact represented by a proposition q, and thus an argument 
from p to q, only if it is reasonable to assume that the fact represented by p necessitates or 
makes liable the fact represented by q.xiii Moreover, not every type of fact can reasonably 
be supposed to necessitate or make liable every other type of fact. For example, no fact of 
pure logic can reasonably be thought to necessitate or make liable any contingent 
biological fact. Thus, if a computer system implements commonsense theory about which 
types of fact can reasonably be thought to necessitate or make liable which other types of 
fact and if the propositions in the text it is considering are marked up as to the types of fact 
they represent, the system can reduce the number of pairs of propositions it examines by 
focusing only on those pairs that represent types of fact that are such that it is reasonable to 
suppose that one of them can necessitate or make liable the other (Reed and Walton, 
2005). 
 
5. Enthymeme and Possible Argument Type Detection 
We focus now on the process of argument reconstruction, proceeding from that stage at 
which we have detected an argument within a text. The next stages in reconstructing the 
argument consist in determining whether it is enthymematic and, further, what type of 
argument it might be. Recall, in discussing Kang’s argument, we proceeded to determine 
that the argument contained in the text was enthymematic immediately after having 
determined that the text contained an argument. The intuition that led us to conclude that 
the argument was incomplete was that a complete argument ought to describe explicitly 
how one fact supposedly conveys another fact. Building on this intuition, we can formulate 
a general criterion for determining whether an argument within some text is complete: a 
complete argument is one in which the conveying fact, the appropriate relation of 
conveyance and the conveyed fact are all explicitly represented. 
 Determining whether a text contains a complete argument should thus be fairly 
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straightforward. Since we are currently investigating the process of argument 
reconstruction that proceeds from the immediate recognition of an argument within a text, 
we can assume that two out of the three facts that are represented by the complete 
argument are already explicitly represented in the text. Specifically, both the conveying 
and the conveyed facts are explicitly represented, or the relation of conveyance and the 
conveying facts are explicitly represented. This is the minimum required so as to allow the 
system to immediately determine that an argument is represented in the text. But if, in 
addition to the requisite representation of a pair of facts required for immediate 
identification of an argument, there is not the third element required in order to constitute 
an argument, the system can assume that the argument is incomplete. 
 If the computer system has determined that an argument is complete, there is, at 
this stage, no need to examine it further. If, by contrast, it has determined that an argument 
is incomplete, there are two options. Either the missing component of the argument 
represents the argument's conveyed fact, or it represents the argument's relation of 
conveyance. Psycholinguistic evidence suggests that the latter is much more likely 
(Sadock, 1977), but since the text being considered is appropriately marked up, the system 
can determine which of these options obtains. If the system finds that the missing 
component represents the conveyed fact, it can, as we will see in the next section, proceed 
directly to reconstruct the missing premise. The rest of this section is not relevant to such 
cases. If it finds that the missing component represents the argument's relation of 
conveyance, it needs to determine what type of argument the argument might be before it 
can reconstruct this component.  
In order to describe how a computer system should go about determining possible 
argument type, we need to be explicit about what, given our conception of argument, 
makes an argument an argument of this or that type. An argument, we have suggested, is a 
representation of a fact as conveying some other fact. Now, we further suggest, what 
makes an argument the type of argument it is is which relation of conveyance it 
 18
represents.xiv On our view, arguments are classified in accordance with the types of facts 
they represent and so in accordance with which relation of conveyance they represent. For 
example, in the argument expressed by 'Saddam’s regime fell, because the US military 
attacked Iraq and if the US military attacked Iraq, Saddam’s regime fell' the relation of 
conveyance represented is the causal relation. So the argument can be correctly classified 
as a causal argument. 
 The component of an argument that determines its type thus consists in a 
representation of a relation of conveyance. This component, which we will call the 
argument’s warrant, is most perspicuously captured by conditionals of the form 'if x, then 
(via relation of conveyance r) y', where r is a variable for representations of relations of 
conveyance, x for statements of conveying facts and y for statements of conveyed facts.  
 Having clarified what determines an argument’s type, we can return to the question 
of how to determine what type of argument an argument might be in cases where its 
implicit component represents a relation of conveyance, i.e. in cases where its implicit 
component is a warrant. Since we know that the missing element is a warrant, we know 
that both a proposition representing the argument's conveying fact and a proposition 
representing its conveyed fact will be explicit and marked up as to type. This information 
allows determining which warrants might be used to infer, together with the statement of 
the conveying fact, that the conveyed fact is the case.  
 Consider a statement, p, that represents a fact, A, and a statement, q, that represents 
a fact, B. On our view, a warrant for inferring q from p states that if p, then (via a suitable 
relation of conveyance) q. But one should read this warrant into a text only if the warrant 
is reasonable and so only if it represents a relation of conveyance that can reasonably be 
supposed to relate facts of the type that A is to facts of the type that B is. Thus, candidate 
warrants for inferring q from p must belong to a class of warrants that represent relations 
of conveyance that can reasonably be thought to relate facts of the type of A to facts of the 
type of B. This is a substantial constraint on which warrant might be used to infer q from 
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p. No relation of conveyance can reasonably be thought to relate just any type of fact to 
any other type of fact.  
 Accordingly, if a computer system gleans from a suitably marked up text that 
statement p represents a fact of the type of A and that statement q represents a fact of the 
type of B, it can, on our conception of argument type, determine which class of warrants 
might be used to infer q from p. In order to do so, it need only implement an adequate 
theory of which relations of conveyance there are and of which types of fact each such 
relation can reasonably be thought to relate.  
 
6. Reasoned Premise Reconstruction 
We are now in a position to describe how a computer can go about reconstructing missing 
premises. Moreover, here too, our conception of argument and argument type will be of 
assistance. The missing statement we are looking for is either a warrant or a statement 
describing a conveyed fact. If the missing statement is supposed to describe the conveyed 
fact, it is easily deduced from the argument’s warrant along with the statement of the 
conveying fact. The warrant describes the appropriate relation of conveyance and what 
will be conveyed if the conveying fact obtains. Thus, the explicit statement of the 
conveying fact, along with the warrant, allows the immediate deduction of the implicit 
conveyed fact. For example, in the argument expressed by 'Saddam’s regime fell, because 
the US military attacked Iraq and if the US military attacked Iraq, Saddam’s regime fell’, 
the warrant ‘if the US military attacked Iraq, Saddam’s regime fell’ and the representation 
of the conveying fact, ‘The US military attacked Iraq’ immediately imply the 
representation of the conveyed fact, ‘Saddam’s regime fell’. 
 Things are more complex when the missing statement is a warrant. This was the 
case with Kang’s argument. In reconstructing his warrant, we recognised that the 
conveyed fact represented by his argument was represented by, (a) ‘it is hunger that is 
claiming its victims’, and that the conveying fact was represented by (b), ‘the district 
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administration is apathetic and the Public Distribution system has failed’. We noted that, 
given our background knowledge and especially our grasp of the nature of the facts 
described by (a) and (b), it is fair to conclude that the facts in question are related by some 
kind of causal dependence. We then expressed this dependence using the causal 
conditional, ‘if the fact described by (b) is the case, then so is the fact described by (a)’. By 
representing the types of individual propositions, and the ways in which these types can be 
used in different warrants, it is similarly possible for a computer system to narrow down 
the set of possible ways in which premises and conclusions might be linked. To guarantee 
a single solution, further background knowledge would also need to be captured. 
 Since the system has identified a certain argument as such, we know that it has an 
explicit representation according to which the argument’s conveying fact makes liable (or 
necessitates), in the circumstances, the argument’s conveyed fact. Thus, a statement to the 
effect that if the conveying fact is the case, it makes liable (or necessitates) the conveyed 
fact is our first candidate for being the argument’s warrant. However, the weak 
justificatory strength of warrants that represent the very abstract relations of necessitating 
or making liable means that such statements are not likely to be used in justifying claims. 
In the case of Kang’s argument, for example, it was clear that our reason for thinking that 
the fact described by (b) makes the fact described by (a) liable in the circumstances was 
our realising that the two facts are (supposedly) causally dependent. 
 The computer system ought, then, to seek a warrant that represents a more concrete 
relation than that which it can already assume the argument uses, i.e. it ought to seek one 
that represents neither the relation of making liable nor that of necessitating. Specifically, 
it ought to seek a warrant that represents a more concrete relation that supposedly obtains 
(i.e. that relates supposedly actual particulars or properties) and that, further, is compatible 
with one of the types of argument that the argument under consideration might be (i.e. that 
can be represented by one of the types of argument that the argument under consideration 
might be). Only if the attempt to uncover a warrant that represents a more concrete relation 
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of conveyance fails should the computer system conclude that the already available 
candidate warrant is the best candidate for being the argument’s warrant. 
How is the computer system to determine whether its background information and 
theory implies a warrant that might be used by a given argument and that represents an 
appropriately concrete relation of conveyance? At this stage in the process of argument 
reconstruction, the system has gone through the process of possible argument type 
detection, and so has used its information about which relations of conveyance there are 
and about which types of fact each relation of conveyance might reasonably be thought to 
relate, in order to select a class of possible warrants for the argument it is considering. In 
addition to information about the class in question, the system's background information 
should include statements of the facts typical individuals are familiar with, statements 
which are marked up so as to indicate which types of fact they represent, and thus which 
(if any) relations of conveyance they supposedly represent and which types of fact each 
supposed relation of conveyance supposedly relates. This information can be used to guide 
and reduce the process of determining whether the computer’s information and theory 
implies that if the conveying fact that the argument represents obtains, then, in virtue of a 
suitable relation of conveyance, so too does the conveyed fact it represents (Reed and 
Walton, 2005). 
Here is an example of how the mark up of background information according to 
the types of facts they represent constrains the process of selecting a suitable warrant. 
Assume that a computer system is trying to deduce 'Rab' (i.e. the claim that fact a conveys, 
via relation R, fact b) from its background information and theory, and thus to determine 
whether a warrant representing R can be used to argue from the claim that a to the claim 
that b. 'Rab' itself represents a fact of a certain type, one the system knows can only 
reasonably be supposed to be related by some relations of conveyance to some types of 
facts. Thus, the system need not examine what follows from each piece of background 
information it has in attempting to deduce 'Rab'. It can focus solely on pieces of 
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background information that represent types of facts that can reasonably be supposed to be 
related to Rab. 
Of course, the computer system might discover more than a single viable candidate 
warrant that represents a relation of conveyance that is more concrete than those of 
necessitating or making liable. If it does, it should pick that candidate which represents the 
most concrete of the relations of conveyance that are represented by the viable candidate 
warrants. Our assumption here is that the information the computer system possesses about 
which relations of conveyance there are is supplemented by information about their 
relative degrees of abstraction.  
In requiring that the computer system seek a warrant that represents a more 
concrete relation than those of making liable or necessitating, we are reiterating our 
commitment to a minimalist programme of warrant reconstruction. Seeking a warrant that 
represents a more concrete relation of conveyance means seeking one that is less general 
and so less risky. At the same time, the use we are making of mark up shows how our 
minimalism is constrained by fidelity to the text. The text carries information about the 
types of the conveying and conveyed facts represented by the argument, and this 
delineates the class of candidate warrants for the argument by delineating the class of 
relations of conveyance which might be represented by its warrant. Background 
information further helps to narrow down the class of warrants by allowing the system to 
determine which relations of conveyance are actually supposed to relate the conveying and 
conveyed facts. It is among warrants that represent these remaining relations of 
conveyance that the computer system selects the one that is the most concrete.xv  
Let us illustrate our approach to reasoned warrant detection by considering Kang’s 
argument once again. The warrant we surmised it used was something like, ‘if the district 
administration is apathetic and the Public Distribution system has failed, then this will 
cause hunger to claim its victims’. How might a computer system reach the conjecture that 
this is the missing warrant in Kang’s argument? The system is already working under the 
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assumption that Kang’s argument is of one of a number of types, that is to say that is uses 
one of a number of relations of conveyance. Moreover, one of these relations is that of 
causal dependence. Thus, if it has or can deduce a suitable statement of causal dependence, 
it will have a good candidate for the role of missing warrant. Consider, then, the following 
two statements: 
(1) The people in Baran cannot feed themselves 
(2) If people cannot feed themselves and government cannot feed them, hunger 
will claim its victims. 
 
Statement (2) is a statement of causal dependence. Moreover, it is plausible to suppose that 
something like it is explicitly among the causal statements represented in a reader’s 
background theory. Thus, let us assume that (2) is appropriately marked up among the 
background theoretical statements of the computer system we are envisaging. Since (2) is 
marked up as a statement of causal dependence, and thus as being compatible with one of 
the types of argument that Kang’s argument might be, the computer system should take it 
to be a statement from which an appropriate warrant for Kang’s argument might be 
deduced. That it is such a statement is further confirmed by seeing that the types of facts it 
represents as being related by the relation of causal dependence include the types of facts 
that are represented by the explicit premise and conclusion of Kang's argument. The 
system must, accordingly, try to deduce a viable candidate warrant from (2) along with 
additional suitable background information (that is to say from (2) along with other 
statements marked up as statements that represent types of facts that (2) represents as 
being related by the relation of causal dependence). Assuming that the computer has (1) 
among the statements that make up its background information, it will be able to deduce a 
statement of the conveyed fact, namely of the fact that hunger is claiming its victims, from 
(2) along with (1). With this success, it can conclude that (2) along with (1) immediately 
entail a good candidate for the role of warrant for Kang's argument. In other words, it can 
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conclude that a good candidate for the role of warrant for Kang's argument is that, in the 
circumstances, if the government does not feed them, hunger will claim its victims. The 
computer system can then compare this conditional with other good candidates it has 
uncovered and choose the one that represents the most concrete relation of conveyance. 
 
7. Reasoned Argument Detection 
The above concludes our discussion of immediate argument detection, that is to say cases 
of argument detection in which a system already explicitly represents the conveying fact of 
an argument as necessitating or making liable its conveyed fact, or in which a system 
explicitly represents the conveying fact and the relation of conveyance of an argument. 
What remains is to consider how a computer might detect and reconstruct an argument 
where immediate recognition is not possible. 
 If a computer system considers a pair of propositions, p and q, from a text it can 
attempt to deduce, from its background information and theory, a warrant according to 
which if p, then (via a suitable relation of conveyance) q. The process of doing so is 
identical to the process of warrant identification already described in our discussion of 
reasoned premise reconstruction. If a suitable warrant is uncovered, this process will not 
only tell us that there is an argument in the text, but will also yield a complete 
reconstruction of the argument in question. 
 If the propositions being considered do not represent conveying and conveyed 
facts, they may yet turn out to be components of an argument if one of them represents a 
conveying fact and the other a relation of conveyance. In such cases, determining whether 
two propositions represent an argument is just a matter of determining whether one of 
them states that facts of the type that are represented by the other convey something. The 
mark up of propositions as to the types of facts they represent and the system's information 
about relations of conveyance should suffice immediately to determine this. 
 
 25
8. A Model of Argument Recognition and Reconstruction 
We now offer, in Figure 2, a complete, if abstract, architecture of the argument 
reconstruction process. 
 
Statement Recognition and Reconstruction
Immediate Argument Detection
Missing Premise Detection
Yes
Reasoned Argument Detection
No
Possible Argument Type Detection
Reasoned Premise ReconstructionModify Text
Premise Reconstruction
End Process
No
Yes
 
Figure 2 
 
The process begins with statement reconstruction. It then proceeds to deal with all those 
arguments that can be immediately detected. This part of the process proceeds until the 
stage of text modification, that is to say that stage at which the original text might be 
modified by adding to it missing premises the computer system has uncovered. Once the 
stage of text modification has been seen to, the computer system proceeds to examine 
whether additional immediate arguments are detectable in the text as a result of the text 
modification. If such arguments are detectable, the process of immediate argument 
reconstruction is carried out again on the additional arguments. If no additional arguments 
are immediately detectable, the computer system proceeds to the stage of reasoned 
argument detection. Here too, the process proceeds until the stage of text modification, and 
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then returns to the stage of immediate text detection. If no additional arguments are 
immediately detectable and, then, no additional arguments are detectable by reasoning, the 
process terminates. 
 
9. Implementation 
With this architecture in place, it becomes possible to identify modular components that 
can be investigated relatively independently. In a sense then, Figure 2 represents both a 
large-scale programme of work and a means of integrating the component results of that 
work. For some areas, extant results and implementations can be re-used; in others, new 
theoretical or empirical research is required; and in yet others, implementation is more 
readily pursuable.  
 A theory of argument types has been developed that is founded upon the notion of 
argument summarised here (Katzav and Reed, 2004). A system for representing the 
knowledge constituted by such arguments is available and mature, inasmuch as it is being 
harnessed in a wide variety of domains such as engineering, pedagogy and the law (Reed 
and Rowe, 2004). The representation of types of fact, types of argument and relationships 
between types of fact has been implemented as a means of “stratifying” knowledge 
databases, and has been employed to improve communication between autonomous 
software agents (Reed and Walton, 2005). In summary then, the mechanics of representing 
partially analysed arguments and background knowledge, and the process of stratified 
reasoned argument reconstruction are currently in place.  
 
10. Conclusion 
The process of argument recognition and reconstruction we have outlined clearly suffers 
from a number of limitations. For example, it does not deal with the reconstruction of 
arguments in which the implicit premise represents a sequence of relations of conveyance 
rather than a single relation of conveyance. So too, it is arguable that our notion of 
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argument is not sufficiently general. Thus, it is arguable that some arguments have 
questions as premises and conclusions, something we have not allowed for. No doubt, 
there are additional limitations to our model. Nevertheless, we believe that a significant 
degree of success can be achieved by implementing the model as its stands and, moreover, 
that the strategies that it employs are sufficiently flexible so as to allow the model to 
function as a foundation upon which future work can build in harnessing results from 
argumentation theory in practical systems that directly implement models of the pragmatic 
structure of argument. We have shown how a programme of work in building 
computational systems that handle argument can be undertaken to a large extent 
independently of the more fine-grained issues of computational semantics and sentence 
understanding, thereby allowing theories of argument structure to be harnessed in 
developing implemented models of argumentative linguistic behaviour. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
i See Knott (1996 & 2000) for a discussion of the rules governing the use of contrastive 
terms such as ‘rather than’. 
ii The process of argument detection that we have been describing does make use of 
pragmatic considerations. However, it only gives these the role of evidence from which 
one infers that there is an argument in the text. The direct recognition of the argument is 
taken to consist in recognising a certain semantic fact, namely that it is supposed to be the 
case that certain facts make death due to poverty and starvation liable. This is what will 
allow us, later on, to bypass pragmatic considerations in our theory of argument 
recognition. 
iii On our view, conditionals often express a kind of dependence between facts that is not 
captured by the material conditional of logic. Nothing significant turns on this here. Those 
who disagree can simply replace the term 'then' in the conditional with 'then an effect of 
this will be that', thus ensuring that the conditional represents a causal relation. 
iv Facts can be viewed as coming in different species or kinds, just as, say, animals can. 
Thus, for example, facts can be classified as abstract or concrete, moral or descriptive, 
causal or non-causal and so on. So statements can be marked up (and so classified) in 
accordance with the species or kinds of facts they represent. If, for example, a statement 
represents a fact in which one object causes another, the statement can be marked up so as 
to indicate that it is a causal statement. 
v More accurately, we require that the computer system produce a representation of a new 
text. We write as if the computer system operates directly on texts in order to avoid 
awkward phrasing.  
vi There are a variety of uses to which final texts produced by the computer system could 
be put. For example, they could be used to construct argument diagrams of the kind that 
we have offered in this article. 
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vii The view of arguments we will be outlining here is developed at length in (Katzav and 
Reed, 2004). 
viii Notice that we do not identify propositions with atomic propositions that is to say with 
propositions that cannot be decomposed into other propositions. Anything that might be 
the content of an intentional attitude, and thus which is a candidate for truth and falsity, 
counts as a proposition. 
ix The idea that arguments are propositions is an old one. See, for example, Bosanquet’s 
(1888, pp. 1-2) related conception of arguments as a species of judgment. 
x The proposition need not, we emphasize, represent one fact as conveying another and as 
doing so irrespective of attending circumstances. It need only represent the relation of 
conveyance as holding in actual circumstances.  
xi In order to avoid unnecessary complications, we are here only outlining a slightly 
simplified version of our conception of arguments. 
xii Alternative (b) is needed since it covers cases in which the text only has explicit 
representations of the relation of conveyance and of the conveying fact. 
xiii We here employ the charitable principle that the claims implicit in texts are reasonable. 
It has been argued (Davidson, 1974) that some such principle must be employed in 
interpretation. 
xiv Notice that an argument's type depends on which relation of conveyance it represents 
rather than on which type of relation of conveyance it represents. For further discussion of, 
and for some amendments to, the definition of argument type given here see (Katzav and 
Reed, 2004).  
xv There is a wide range of techniques for warrant reconstruction advocated in the 
literature, from the parsimonious to the profligate, as well as positions between (see, e.g. 
(Hitchcock, 1985; Ennis, 1982; Gilbert, 1991)). Implementing these different techniques is 
merely a matter of changing the rule for selecting which of the set of warrants that are 
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compatible with the text and with the computer system's background information should 
be selected by the system. 
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